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Akinloye Akindayomi (USA), Sergio Garcia (USA)

Drug violence in Mexico and its impact on the fiscal realities of border cities in Texas: evidence from Rio Grande Valley counties
Abstract
This study examines the potential spillover effects of the Mexican drug war and its associated violence on the fiscal
realities of the U.S. border counties. Specifically, we study descriptively the data from the Rio Grande Valley (RGV)
counties of the state of Texas, placing it within the broader context of all Texas counties, and find initial evidence of
possible ‘silver lining’ spilling over from Mexican drug violence to the U.S. border counties’ fiscal positions. Housing
activities increase and property tax reliance decreases in RGV counties relative to other Texas counties (both border
and non-border). We anticipate that the findings and the suggestive evidence advanced by this study will motivate
additional research efforts that can be potentially value-relevant in the policy responses from relevant U.S. authorities.
Keywords: fiscal realities, property tax reliance, border counties, Rio Grande Valley.
JEL Classification: M41, H83.

Introduction 1
The growing incidence of drug violence in Mexico
practically possesses real spillover effects on border
counties in the U.S.12In part, these effects are generally pronounced in the economic activities and the
fiscal realities of these border cities/counties. Therefore, this study examines a link between the fiscal
position and migration (following the drug violence)
into a major border region in Texas; i.e. The Rio
Grande Valley (hereinafter referred to as RGV).
Covering a period between 2000 and 2011, the empirical data and preliminary descriptive results provide initial evidence on the implications of the spillover effects of the drug violence on RGV’s host
counties’ real estate landscape and revenue dynamics. To this end, we review the population dynamics
of the border counties in the wake of the renewed
drug violence in Mexico cities and the spillover
effects on the housing, revenue profile and the fiscal
realities of the U.S. border cities/counties. Beyond
the common negativities widely popularized and
associated with the violence, our initial evidence
suggests that in border counties, there might be a
‘silver lining’ to the Mexico drug violence as some
Mexicans’ ‘flight to safety’ and ‘flight to quality’
bring with them economic prosperity and investible
capital into the U.S. In other words, because of the
drug violence, Mexico is inadvertently forfeiting
economic prosperity to U.S. border counties.
Several motivations have been suggested in the literature driving households’ moves and migration
activities. These generally include job, income, or
family changes (see Wheaton, 1990 and Stephen,
2009). In other words, the pursuit of better oppor-

© Akinloye Akindayomi, Sergio Garcia 2014.
1
Throughout this study, reference to border counties is limited to counties that share border with Mexico. We do not mean counties that share
‘border’ with other U.S. states. In essence, we mean Texas counties on
the U.S. side of the international border with Mexico.

tunities and economic prosperity is the chief driving
force of migration. However, a situation where violence persists such as in the Mexico-U.S. borders,
the urge to flee to security, economic safety and
prosperity becomes more compelling and real. Unfortunately in some cases, violence is readily importable into the otherwise peaceful U.S. border
cities/counties. Schaan (2009) notes that in the extreme scenarios, “…civil authorities cede entire
geographic regions, and the lawless organizations
develop enclaves of autonomy…”, creating economic orphanage in the border cities and counties of the
U.S. Therefore, embedded in the economic forces,
we add that heinous violence in locations with close
proximity to a prosperous country like the U.S. is
another real motive for migration that can impact
economic activities in the host country and in particular, the fiscal realities of its border counties.
While the spillover effects of such violence are typically perceived in the negative, we argue that potentially, Mexico and its border communities cede both
investment and human capital to U.S. border counties as a result of this culture of violence.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the current
study is one of the first attempts to explore Mexican
drug violence, immigration and the implication for
the fiscal realities of border counties in the U.S.
Research efforts in this area are emerging and perhaps constrained by data availability. Therefore, it is
anticipated that the current study’s descriptive results will motivate additional inquiries and interests
in this area of research.
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. The
next section (Section 1) which presents the literature
review and framework provides a brief background
of RGV and its counties. We then review the literature specifically in the domains of housing, immigration and drug related crime and counties’ revenue. In section 2, we present the data and discuss the
initial evidence. Section 3 concludes the study.
51
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1. Literature review and framework
In this section, we present a brief background of the
Rio Grande Valley (RGV) and its counties and then
place it within the context of the study. Further, we
provide the framework for the study by reviewing
the interconnectedness among housing, immigration
and drug related violence as well as counties revenue and fiscal conditions.
1.1. Rio Grande Valley: Brief history and background. The Rio Grande Valley (RGV) in southern
Texas has developed from a largely agricultural
community into one of the fastest growing Hispanic
areas in the country. According to the 2012 U.S.
Census Bureau estimates, the population of RGV is
over 1.3 million with approximately 80% Hispanic.
It is made up of four counties namely: Cameron,
Hidalgo, Starr and Willacy counties. The region has
benefited greatly from the adoption of the NAFTA
accords with growth in many different areas including manufacturing, transportation, retail and construction. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative estimates that the total trade between the U.S.
and Mexico was just shy of 500 billion U.S. dollars
in 2012 but noted that Mexico was the U.S.’s third
largest trading partner.
In addition to the economic growth, many Mexican
nationals continue to establish residence in RGV
counties due to geographical proximity, economic
opportunity, traditional and cultural ties as well as
other demographic conveniences such as language.
Many families in the area are divided on both sides
of the Rio Grande River. Mexicans’ immigration
into RGV, both documented and undocumented, has
also contributed to the economic growth of the area.
RGV counties are mostly Hispanic and incur specific financial attributions such as a low rate of banking residents and high rates of poverty. These issues
coupled with heightened security tensions in Mexico
make RGV a unique and fertile geographical region
for research/studies like ours. It is a place of great
opportunity and growth that has unique issues that
must be addressed independently of national studies.
1.2. Housing. Flight to quality is a readily available
option for many Mexicans in the violence ridden
Mexico-U.S. borders. The U.S. is a quality haven
for that purpose, and it is appropriate to assume that
housing will be a leading quality investment product
(either for residential or speculative investment purposes) especially in the era of depressed housing
prices following the ‘great recession’ of 2008. Case
and Shiller (2003) assert that individuals find real
assets investment to be safe and of quality consideration. Engelhardt (1996) documents the link between housing wealth and homeowner consumption.
Case et al., (2005) find that housing wealth effect is
52

greater than financial wealth effect on homeowner
consumption, as Campbell and Cocco (2004) add
that such effects are more pronounced among older
households.
If one considers the concept of buyer liquidity vis-àvis the diminishing marginal utility for housing demand, it is imperative that liquidity flight to safety
will be amplified by more rather than less buyers; a
dynamic strengthened by more Mexicans’ flight into
the U.S. in the wake and continuation of the drug
1
violence . Typically, such a flight to safety action
tends to mostly trend U.S. cities and counties along
the borders relative to other parts of the U.S., partly
due to family ties and other demographic conveniences such as language and cultural conformity as
it is the case in RGV.
Some may contend that due to this ‘export’ demand
argument, border counties ought to lead the nation
in improved house prices as dictated by the demand
and supply interplay. We find some evidence from
RGV housing data supporting such an assumption.
Therefore, due to the ‘great recession of 2008’, we
will caution on a wholesale acceptance of Wheaton
assertion that “the supply of housing reacts relatively slowly to changes in both market prices and vacancy…” because in a depressed market environment, supply is readily available in the housing
market. Similar scenario characterized the subset of
the period (2008-2011) examined in this study.
The buying capacity of migrants in the U.S.Mexico border cities and counties in the real estate housing market is real. The massive increase
in the number of migrants from Mexico, both
documented and undocumented, coupled with
their low propensity to leave the U.S. and return
to Mexico explain the need for migrants to settle
and buy homes sometimes through proxies (Dube
et al., 2013). Stephen (2009) in her review notes
that the likelihood of an undocumented migrant
returning home dropped sharply from 20 percent
2
in 1982 to less than 5 percent in 2004 .
1.3. Immigration and drug related crime. Undocumented immigration is widely believed to be associated with violence in border cities and counties.
For example, border crimes decline following 1986
amnesty but picked up again in the 1990s as undocumented immigration recommenced. Coronado and
Orrenius (2005) suggest that US authorities’ en1
Employing Stein (1995) analogy, “one buyer with ten units of liquidity
will probably not demand as much housing as ten buyers with one unit
each…’ due to decreasing marginal utility of home ownership.
2
Some immigration researchers cite heightened militarization and
border enforcements as reasons motivating undocumented immigrant
continued stay in the US as those reasons lead to costlier and longer
journey of the migrant into the U.S. in the first place.
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forcement mechanisms (even where effective) actually heighten violence in the border as an unintended consequence of policy responses to undocumented immigration. The authors maintain that
“current levels of enforcement and the extensiveness
of human and drug smuggling are the most likely
dynamics linking undocumented immigration flows
to border crime”; and that “migrant flows adjust to
enforcement crackdowns”. This implies a possible
positive relationship between enforcement crackdowns and undocumented immigration. Cornelius
and Lewis (2006) claim that heightened border enforcements make undocumented migrants to rely on
human smugglers in order to complete their border
crossings. Specifically, Cornelius and Lewis write,
“even if migrants are caught, they keep trying until
they succeed. Our interviews with returned migrants
revealed that 92 percent of them eventually succeeded on the same trip to the border without returning to their place of origin”. Payan (2006) provides
further evidence that recent U.S. immigration and
drug policy responses as well as the free trade
agreement of NAFTA inadvertently aid contempo1
rary trend in immigration and drug smuggling .
Also, Bersin (1997) documents a link between undocumented immigration and drug violence (see
also Dube et al., 2013). Citing border patrol authorities, he mentions that drug smugglers use migrants
to transport some drugs as part of the smugglers fees
for aiding migrants’ crossings across the border.
Andreas (2000) further corroborates the fact that
human smugglers are increasingly linked to organized drug trafficking organizations, (see also Acuna, 2007). This is important given the role of drug
trafficking as a key source of violent crime, more so
that Coronado and Orrenius conclude that violent
crime is consistently the main component of border
crime. McCaffrey and Scales (2011) posit that since
2009, Texas has been progressively under siege
from the increased activities of the Mexican drug
trafficking cartel. This includes spillover violence
and migration into Texas border counties.
Notwithstanding, the strategic position of MexicanU.S. border locales to strong economic expansion
and financial prosperity is well documented. Understanding that Mexico and the U.S. share almost
2000 miles border locales, Adams (2006) sees Mexican-U.S. borders as “a window on the future of
binational relations and interdependence”. In fact,
Payan calls for ‘open recognition of U.S.-Mexico
integration’ leveraging on the ‘unprecedented eco-

1
He also documents the consequences on forty-three border counties of
Texas. He identifies four drug cartels: Tijuana cartel, Sinaloa-Sonora
cartel, Juarez cartel and the Gulf cartel, claiming that “the large cartels
now ride the formal NAFTA economy” with over $80 billion in profits.
For more, see Stephen (2009).

nomic, cultural and political convergence of the two
countries (Stephen, 2009). Schaan (2009) summarizes the significance of the two countries with a
statement “…soon a choice must be made: either the
two nations stand together in a common defense, or
they withdraw into their own borders”.
Thus, the insights espoused by authors like Payan,
Stephen and Schaan suggest that it is almost impossible to untie the umbilical cord of cultural and economic dependence that both countries (U.S. and
Mexico) share. It must however be stressed that
border communities of both countries will be mostly
impacted by activities, events or shocks (such as the
drug violence in Mexico) along the respective borders. Therefore, it is a worthwhile research effort to
examine the impact of the drug violence on the fiscal realities of border counties; of which the descriptive results from the current study preliminarily
suggest a positive spillover effect.
1.4. Revenue. Generally, cities and counties face a
unique portfolio of revenue sources (often subject to
budgetary and statutory constraints) in order to generate the necessary revenue to meet their statutory
public obligations which majorly involves provision
of local public services. According to Waisanen
(2010), 30 states (including Texas) have either tax
or expenditure limit or both. Pagano and Johnston
(2000) in their study of cities and counties revenue
decisions note the constraining implications of ‘state
control over local revenue authority’ on the revenue
generation capacity of those cities and counties.
They argue that the impact of such a control on cities/counties survival during economic downturns
could be significant. Dye and McGuire (1997)
submit that such statutory restraints through property ‘tax cap’ constrain (rather than ‘facilitate’) local
governments fiscal behaviors and those of other
2
‘local fiscal institutions’ . Property taxation appears
to be a reliable and dependable source of local governments’ revenue mix (see Sokolow, 1993) which
among others depends largely on property values
(much more on taxable values as opposed to market
values) within their respective communities. However, in addition to state imposed constraints, there
is an invisible interplay of interjurisdictionally imposed competitive constraint on the ability of cities
or counties to expand tax revenue, since they are
forced to pay attention to tax dynamics in neighboring cities/counties. In sum, taxing powers of local
taxing jurisdictions are influenced by factors that
include the health of the local economy, general
state of the housing market, statutory constraints

2
For more on the impact of State’s imposition of fiscal restraints on
local institutions, see Preston and Ichniowski (1991) and Poterba and
Rueben (1995).
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imposed by State constitutions, population, neighboring taxing jurisdictions and other fiscal variables.
There is a direct link between population growth
and urbanization. Cities and counties are direct beneficiaries of the pros and cons of urbanization. At
the least, local governments hope for neutral effect
of urbanization, the opposite of which usually demands increased spending on local services. Since
four decade ago, Tees (1971) blames state governments for failing to empower local authorities with
the necessary powers to handle the challenges implicit in and associated with urbanization. This
complex inter-governmental fiscal relationship between state and local governments no doubt still
subsists today and it influences the revenue mix of
local governments.
In this study, we examine population dynamics of
the border counties in the wake of the renewed drug
violence in Mexico cities and the spillover effects
on the housing and revenue profile of the U.S. border counties. We argue that U.S. border counties
face challenges of ‘urbanization’ driven by ‘flight to
safety’ from the heinous drug-related violence in the
Mexico border cities. Therefore, it is empirically
important to examine how those counties fiscally
cope with such challenges. Our findings provide
evidence that the spillover effects of the violence
possesses some ‘silver linings’ on U.S. border counties especially in the property tax and sales tax
areas. This outcome should motivate additional
research efforts that can potentially be valuerelevant in the policy responses from relevant
U.S. authorities.
The significance of, and the ability of local governments to impact quality of life of local residents
cannot be underestimated (Gyourko and Tracy,
1991). In the hierarchy of authority and affinity,
these governments are the closest to individuals and
so their fiscal soundness is unquestionably relevant
to their ability to meet local residents’ servicedemand priorities. These priorities include sound
public school system, housing, security and other
requisite infrastructure. Gyourko and Tracy find that
cities fiscal soundness impacts their ability to provide quality amenities to their residents, which directly impact their quality of life.
However, states (including Texas) have continually
imposed fiscal constraints and shifted responsibilities to counties and local governments in the recent
past. Pagano and Johnston (2000) argue that such
constraining interference from the state places substantial fiscal burden on cities and counties thus
inhibiting their ability to carry out their financing
and development programs to their residents. In
order to meet their priorities, these governments
54

usually increase revenue demand from local taxpayers in the form of additional property taxation as
other revenue/taxation sources (such as income taxes or sales taxes) usually face constitutional and
statutory restrictions from the states authorities. In
addition, placing such revenue burdens on local
residents often produces political pushback from
residents. Interestingly, border counties with active
inter-border economic and transactional activities
from non-residents may be able to enlarge the pool
of potential taxpayers (usually through increased
economic activities) and thus spread the revenue
burden. It becomes more viable if border counties
witness inflow of immigrants with decent economic
purchasing abilities to acquire and own real properties within their jurisdictions, thus increasing property taxation base (without rate increase) and the
revenue derivable therefrom. Employment level of
local residents is important in that irrespective of the
county mix of taxes, the ability of residents to help
meet such fiscal obligations depends on their income level. Such a constraint could be relaxed for
border counties as economic vibrancy (where applicable) could be fuelled by crossing immigrants’
purchasing activities.
To further accentuate the importance of property
taxes in the revenue mix of local governments, Pagano and Johnston (2000) note the fluctuation characteristics of sales and income taxes (relative to
property taxes) during economic booms and downturns. It is therefore believed that property tax, relative to sales or income taxes, is a more dependable
source with relatively less distortions to county revenue base across all economic cycles. The extent of
property tax reliance by a county or local government can signal the extent of revenue diversification
profile of such a government. As mentioned by Pagano and Johnston (2000), a high reliance on property tax suggests that such a government has lesser
revenue diversification portfolio. Since property tax
is the primary and dependable revenue source of
many local/county governments, we will expect that
county borders in Texas will have high propertytax-reliance. However, a better scenario will indicate
otherwise in that a lesser property tax reliance could
mean a more diversified revenue mix, especially from
sales tax (where applicable), without a decline in property tax revenue. With such an outcome, it can be
claimed that there is a positive spillover effect from the
drug-induced violence in Mexico-U.S. borders on both
the real estate and other economic activities generating
sales tax income for the border counties. As earlier
mentioned, these border counties need such increased
revenue in order to meet the increased demand/pressure on public amenities/services by additional residents fleeing the violence from across the
border. Similarly, since the county governments in our
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sample possess state authority to levy and collect other
non-property taxes, specifically sales tax, residents are
subject to higher revenue burden. This thus constrains
the ability of local governments to impose or increase
property tax rate or revenue without facing political
resistance from local taxpayers. Hence, the importance
of broadened tax base (from both property and sales
tax) advantage from Mexico nationals fleeing violence
into the U.S. border counties.
2. Data, analysis and discussion of results
Data. The data for this study are obtained from the
office of the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts
1
through a special request and arrangement . In some
instances, the data were hand-collected for meaningful
analysis.
The sample period covers year 2000 through 2011.
These periods are chosen mainly to (1) correspond to
the timelines of significant events surrounding the
Mexican Drug war (2006 to 2011); and (2) allow for
comparison of the descriptive results (pre – 2000 to
2005; post – 2006 to 2011). It is believed that Mexican
authorities renewed the fight against drug cartels resulting in the accompanying violence in 2006 with the
election of President Felipe Calderón. The newly
elected President’s tough and aggressive stances
against the drug cartel’s violence heightened the violent adversarial collision between the Mexican drug
cartels and the Mexican authorities resulting in many
collateral deaths. Certainly, for those who can afford it,
flight to safety becomes the option to escape the escalating mayhem.
Due to cultural consideration (family ties, language) as
well as geographical proximities, border communities
in the U.S. become the natural destinations and ‘safe
2
haven’ for many migrants fleeing the violence . Therefore, beyond the usual concerns of the negative impact
of immigration (especially undocumented) on border
counties, we examine the relevant Rio Grande Valley
(RGV) data descriptively and find preliminary evidence that there could be ‘silver lining’ from the spillover effects of the Mexican drug violence on the U.S.
border counties’ fiscal positions.
To achieve this, we further examine, among others, the
dynamics of changes in population as well as property
values between border and non-border counties in the
State of Texas. Hitherto, the results in the literature

1

Due to the fact that the data are not readily available in the public
domain, we initiated a written request to the Texas Comptroller of
Public Accounts and after some procedural steps and arrangements, we
were given access. Copy of the approval and the data are available upon
request from the authors.
2
We do not distinguish between documented and undocumented immigration in this study because we do not see the compelling need for such
an arbitrary distinction to our study.

regarding the relationship between city size (population) and property taxes have been at best mixed. For
example, while studies such as Dye and McGuire
(1997) suggest positive relation, Song and Zenou
(2003) find a negative relationship between property
taxes and city population, thus creating urban sprawl.
It remains an empirical question whether such migration leads to county sprawl as the recipient county may
face increased flow of property tax revenue and also
sales tax revenue thereby reducing counties property3
tax-reliance .
The variables we examined include County Population
(CP), Total County Market Value (TCMV), Total
County Taxable Value (TCTV), Property Tax Revenue (PTR); and Sales Tax Revenue (STR). With the
exception of STR, we classify and compute the above
mentioned variables into three categories namely: (1)
RGV (Rio Grande Valley data); (2) WRGV (Texas
counties excluding RGV); and (3) NonBorder (non
border counties in Texas). The main difference between (2) and (3) is that the former includes other
border counties in Texas while the latter consist of
only non-border Texas counties. One rationale for
including (2) is that although the RGV counties are the
case study, comparing it with (3) reveals that the descriptive results may be generalizable to other Texas
border counties.
Due to data availability, data on STR used to examine
property tax reliance is only computed for RGV counties and for the period of 2008 through 2011. For the
current study, property-tax-reliance is viewed as the
ratio of property tax to sales tax (refer to earlier discussions on property-tax-reliance).
Results and discussion. Recall that our study covers
Texas counties with emphasis on the Rio Grande Valley border counties. Averages for CP, TCVMV,
TCTV and PTR are computed over the sample period
for each of the three categories stated above. Table 1
and 2 contain the averages and the percentage of
change in county information respectively for year
2000 through 2011. However, Table 2 splits the data
into Pre (2000 – 2005) and Post (2006 – 2011) analysis period (refer to the rationale for setting up the Pre
and Post analysis period above). Figures 1 through 4
accompany Table 1. It is also worthy to note that all
the variables in WRGV are slight higher compared to
non-border. For example with respect to CP, it suggests that border counties in Texas are experiencing
higher population growth relative to non-border counties. Overall, it could imply that the preliminary findings of our study may be generalizable to other border
counties in Texas.

3

We use county sprawl to mean inter-county movements.
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Table 1 – County population
Year

Table 2 – Percentage change in county information

RGV

WRGV

Non-border

Panel A

2000

245,926.50

79,849.03

79,191.45

Post Change

2001

251,294.50

81,310.68

80,674.43

2002

258,169.50

82,712.44

84,465.67

2003

265,358.80

83,985.46

83,370.72

2004

272,387.80

85,315.07

2005

278,948.00

2006

RGV

WRGV

On-border

CP

15.88%

11.97%

11.50%

TCVMV

62.78%

56.67%

56.35%

84,698.48

TCTV

62.47%

54.57%

54.19%

86,744.51

86,138.19

PTR

60.29%

50.70%

50.67%

285,304.80

88,911.22

88,322.83

Panel B

2007

291,465.20

90,687.36

90,120.26

P

CMV

CTV

PTR

2008

298,093.20

92,447.67

91,886.60

RGV/WRGV

3.92%

6.12%

7.90%

9.59%

2009

305,147.20

94,246.85

93,679.58

WRGV/NonBorder

0.46%

0.31%

0.38%

0.03%

2010

317,841.50

95,928.40

95,162.14

2011

323,935.80

97,515.75

96,723.51

Notes: *This table shows the averages of the county population
for Texas counties. *RGV = Rio Grande Valley counties;
WRGV = Without Rio Grande Valley counties; *Non-border =
Texas counties that do not share border with Mexico. *Original
data obtained from the office of Texas Comptroller of Public
Accounts, Austin, TX.

On average, county population (CP) for RGV Pre
(Post) period grows by approximately 262,000
(304,000) representing 16% growth. During the
same period, CP for WRGV and non-border each
increases by nearly 12% (i.e. 11.97% and 11.50%
respectively). It is therefore safe to say that on average, the population of the RGV counties grows faster in 2006 and beyond relative to other counties in
the state of Texas. Similar trend occurs for other
variables examined in this study (see Table 2).

Notes: *This table shows the percentage changes in county
information. *RGV = Rio Grande Valley counties; WRGV =
Without Rio Grande Valley counties; Non-border = Texas
counties that do not share border with Mexico. *CP is the County Population; TCVMV is the Total County Housing Market
Value; TCTV is the Total County Taxable Value; PTR is the
Property Tax Revenue. *Panel A shows percentage changes in
each variable between the Pre (2000-2005) and Post (20062011) periods. *Panel B shows the percentage changes reported
in Panel A across the counties. *Original data obtained from the
office of Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Austin, TX.

The data also shows that in RGV counties, the market value of housing (TCMV) during the Post period
is approximately 6% greater than Texas counties
outside RGV (i.e. WRGV). In the same vein, there
is 8% difference for taxable value of housing between RGV counties and other counties. On average, the property tax revenue of RGV counties is
approximately 10% higher than non-RGV counties
in the post period.

Notes: *This figure shows the graph of the county population in Texas counties between 2000 and 2011. *The graph for RGV vs.
Non-border looks substantially the same. Therefore, it is not shown for expositional convenience. *RGV = Rio Grande Valley counties; WRGV = Without Rio Grande Valley counties; Non-border =Texas counties that do not share border with Mexico.
Fig. 1. County population (CP) (2000 – 2001)
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Notes: *This Figure shows the graph of the market value of the housing stock in Texas counties between 2000 and 2011. *The graph
for RGV vs. Non-border looks substantially the same. Therefore, it is not shown for expositional convenience. *RGV = Rio Grande
Valley counties; WRGV = Without Rio Grande Valley counties; Non-border = Texas counties that do not share border with Mexico.
Fig. 2. Total county market value (TCMV) (2000-2001)

Notes: *This figure shows the graph of the taxable value of the housing stock in Texas counties between 2000 and 2011. *The graph
for RGV vs. Non-border looks substantially the same. Therefore, it is shown for expositional convenience. *RGV = Rio Grande
Valley counties; WRGV = Without Rio Grande Valley counties; Non-border = Texas counties that do not share border with
Mexico.
Fig. 3. Total county taxable value (TCTV) (2000-2011)

Notes: *This figure shows the graph of the property tax revenue in Texas counties between 2000 and 2011. *The graph for RGV vs.
Non-border looks substantially the same. Therefore, it is not shown for expositional convenience. *RGV = Rio Grande Valley counties; WRGV = Without Rio Grande Valley counties; Non-border = Texas counties that do not share border with Mexico.
Fig. 4. Property tax revenue (PTR) (2000-2001)

A careful look at the graphs in Figures 1 through 4
reveals that there is a break in virtually all the graphs
sometimes around 2007. Therefore, a further analysis
is conducted to statistically test the slope of the graphs

for each of the variables around the years of break
(specifically for 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008). The
results are presented in Table 3. The following equations representing the tests of the breaks in those spe57
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cific years help contextualize the numbers and the
respective Figures (i.e. Figures 1-4).

Yt = β1t * RGVt + β 2t *WRGVt + β 3 RGVt +

(1)

+ β 4WRGVt + β 5Tt + β 6t * Tt + ε t

where: Y = CP, TCMV, TCTV, PTR individually.
t = 2000, 2001, …, 2011.
T = 1, if t ≥ T; T = 0, if t < Ƭ.
T is the dummy variable that defines the year of
break; Ƭ is the year of break, (i.e. Ƭ = 2005,
2006, 2007, 2008 individually).
RGV and WRGV are as described above.
The slope when T = 0 (T = 1) are individually
presented for RGV and WRGV equations 2 (3)
below:

δY
= β1 ,
δt

(2a)

δY
= β2 .
δt

(2b)

Where β3 and β4 are the intercepts respectively.

δY
= β1 + β6
δt

.(3a)

δY
= β 2 + β6 ………………………
δt

(3b)

Where (β3 +β5) and (β4 +β5 ) are the intercepts
respectively.
With the exception of CP, the test of breaks in the
linear trend forecast for all the variables are significant from year 2007. The slope of CP is significant from year 2006. In all variables, year
2005 is not significant at the conventional threshold (i.e. 95% confidence interval) and they are
not reported for expositional convenience. Recall
that the Mexico war on drug was renewed in
2006, it takes at least one year for the effects
(measured by variables listed above) to manifest.
Though, the pattern of significance in the trend
line slope for CP interestingly implies that the
population growth is immediately captured in
2006 at the start of the renewed Mexican drug
war; it is realistic to expect that even if people
flee the violence in 2006, it will take time before
certain decisions on home ownership or related
investments can be implemented1.

Table 3. Test of slope analysis
Panel A
Year (Break)

CP

TCTV

TCMV

PTR

Coefficients

P-value

Coefficients

P-value

Coefficients

P-value

Coefficients

P-value

2006

807.751

0.010

-59748273.086

0.519

-95088737.071

0.253

-2326936.314

0.049

2007

1014.260

0.003

-288804694.504

0.001

-292270373.618

0.000

-3687383.104

0.003

2008

1275.134

0.002

-550133958.910

0.000

-515189943.094

0.000

-5696851.132

0.000

Panel B
Year (Break)

Coefficients

P-value

Coefficients

P-value

Coefficients

P-value

Coefficients

P-value

2006

813.890

0.016

-60042978.614

0.519

-95663094.657

0.252

-2323106.414

0.050

2007

1019.029

0.005

-289656279.504

0.001

-293469603.157

0.000

-3689572.400

0.003

2008

1267.461

0.005

-553172661.113

0.000

-517824104.758

0.000

-5708907.388

0.000

Note: *This table shows the econometric test of slope. *RGV = Rio Grande Valley counties; WRGV = Without Rio Grande Valley
counties; non-border = Texas counties that do not share border with Mexico. *CP is the County Population; TCVMV is the Total
County Housing Market Value; TCTV is the Total County Taxable Value; PTR is the Property Tax Revenue. *Panel A shows the
test results with border counties. *Panel B shows the test results without border counties. *Original data obtained from the office of
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Austin, TX.

Figure 5 presents the property tax reliance graph.
Recall that for the current study, property-taxreliance is described as the ratio of property taxrevenue (PTR) to sales tax revenue (STR)2. For reasons
earlier mentioned, the graph covers period of 2008
12

through 2011. It can be observed from the diagram that
the trend line is negatively sloped. This implies that
during those years, RGV counties consistently have
lower property tax reliance (a higher increase in
STR), notwithstanding the increase in property tax

1
It will be observed from Table 3 that β6 in all variables (i.e. TCVMV, TCTV and PTR) are negative with the exception of CP. Econometrically, it
means that in variables with negative β6, the slope is flatter but steeper in CP with positive coefficient. Practically, this could be interpreted that while
RGV counties encounter higher population growth relative to other Texas counties (border or non-border); it is not everyone that participates in
home buying or related investments.
2
During the sample period, the tax rates for both property tax and sales tax are substantially stable. Therefore, a change in tax rates is ruled out as a
cause for movements in PTR or STR.
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revenue relative to other Texas counties. A potentially
confounding explanation for the increase in STR is
that many Mexican nationals/residents frequent on a
daily basis (with temporary visa) Texas border counties (including RGV) and make purchases that are
subject to sales tax. These migrant visitors are generally referred to as ‘Cross-Border Mexican Shoppers’.
However, this is not of first-order concern to this study

because those ‘visitors’ are entitled to the sales tax
rebate (called ‘manifiesto’ by the Mexicans) that re1
funds the amount of sales taxes paid . In fact, Mogab
et al. (2005) in their survey of ‘Cross-Border Mexican
Shoppers’, report that nearly 7 out of 10 respondents
claimed that the sales tax rebate “was important” to
their decisions to shop in the U.S. and that only 1 in 10
considered it “unimportant”.

Property sales ratio
Note: *This Figure shows the graph of the property- tax-reliance in RGV counties between 2008 and 2011.
Fig. 5. Property-tax-reliance (2008– 2011)

Conclusion
This study examines the potential spillover effects
of the Mexican drug war and its associated violence on the fiscal realities of the U.S. border
counties. Specifically, we study descriptively the
data from the Rio Grande Valley (RGV) counties
of the state of Texas and find initial evidence of
possible ‘silver lining’ spilling over from Mexican drug violence to the U.S. border counties’
fiscal positions. During the sample period, we
find that housing activities increase and propertytax-reliance decreases in RGV counties relative to
other Texas counties (both border and nonborder).
The renewed fight against the Mexican drug cartels following the election of President Felipe
Calderón in late 2006 brought about unimaginable
violence on the people of Mexico and for those
who could afford it, fleeing to safety at safe havens in the U.S. becomes the readily available
option. Typically, such a flight to safety action
tends to mostly trend U.S. cities and counties
along the borders relative to other parts of the
U.S., partly due to geographical proximities,
family ties and other demographic conveniences
such as language and cultural conformity (as it is
the case in RGV). Therefore, beyond the common
negativities widely popularized, our initial evidence suggests that in border counties, there

might be a ‘silver lining’ to the Mexico drug violence as some Mexicans’ ‘flight to safety’ and
‘flight to quality’ bring with them economic prosperity and investible capital into the U.S. In other
words, because of the continued drug violence,
Mexico is inadvertently forfeiting economic prosperity to U.S. border counties. This in turn improves the revenue side of the fiscal positions of
U.S. border counties.1
We must acknowledge that the population growth
in RGV may not only be attributed to flight to
safety activities from violence; it could be because of growing economic opportunities in the
RGV area. Also, this study focuses on the revenue
side of counties fiscal profile. Looking at the expenditure side is equally important. We anticipate
that the findings and evidence advanced by our
study will motivate additional interests and research agenda in this important area of counties’
and local governments’ public and municipal
finance.

1
One rationale for sales tax rebate is that the U.S. constitution forbids
state authorities from levying tax on exported goods outside the U.S.
borders. Therefore, sales to Mexican nationals that visit U.S. on temporary basis for shopping are deemed exports. For more on ‘manifiesto,
see Mogab et al (2005).
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